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Abstract 
This paper integrates two traditions in taxing theory by constructing a primitive general equilibrium (GE) model which 
incorporates a public good, and examine the desirability of taxing system to sustain its optimum level.  Formally, we start with 
utilizing the Lindahl mechanism to compute a Pareto-optimal public good level under a specification of the parameters on 
production and utility function, with k the substitution parameter on the latter. The burden-sharing in this Lindahl mechanism is 
called the Lindahl tax. We compute the rates of various taxes in order to sustain the optimal public good level, and compare the 
Gini coefficients and the social welfares.  It is shown for a specified case that when 0<k<1, there exists no general equilibrium for 
the poll tax case, while the income tax (and proportional commodity tax) is more desirable than the Lindahl tax from the 
viewpoint of Gini coefficient and also from the utilitarian social welfare viewpoint. Next, selecting parameters on production and 
utility functions and initial endowments randomly, we show that the property is robust, provided that 0<k<1. However, when 
k<0, the same simulation shows that the Lindahl tax is more desirable than the income tax (and proportional commodity tax) 
from the two viewpoints. Finally, it is shown that when 0<k<1, the Walrasian tatonnement process to compute the income tax is 
globally stable, while the one when k<0 is locally unstable. Thus, this paper concludes that the income tax (and the proportional 
commodity tax) tends to be superior to the Lindahl tax in order to provide public good. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to extend Fukiharu1, whose aim was to integrate two traditions of taxation problem. On 
the one hand, the argument on taxation is constructed in such a way that which taxation is desirable in order to 
impose a tax, income tax, commodity tax or poll tax, without paying any attention on why the tax is necessary. In 
the partial equilibrium framework, Stiglitz2, Chapter 17, regards the lump-sum tax, such as poll tax, the best. On the 
other hand, it is also a tradition to assert that government imposes a tax in order to provide public goods (Stiglitz2, 
Chapter 4).  Fukiharu1 combined the above two traditions by constructing a primitive general equilibrium (GE) 
model which incorporates a public good, asking which taxation is desirable in order to impose tax, income tax, 
commodity tax, or poll tax to provide the public good.  In this paper, we first summarize Fukiharu1 in two parts. In 
Part I, we utilize the Lindahl mechanism to compute a Pareto-optimal public good level under a specification of 
parameters. The burden-sharing in this Lindahl mechanism may be regarded as a tax on the society members, while 
utilizing pseudo-market mechanism. We call it Lindahl tax. Next, we compute the rate of income tax in order to 
sustain the optimal public good level, and compare the Lindahl tax and income tax.  We proceed to the computation 
of the rate of (proportional) commodity tax in order to sustain the optimal public good level, and compare the 
Lindahl tax, income tax and commodity tax. Finally we proceed to the comparison between the Lindahl tax, income 
tax, commodity tax and poll tax under the specification of the model. In Part II, selecting the parameters randomly, 
we examine the robustness of the conclusion in Part I. The conclusion in Fukiharu1 was not strong, in that the 
conclusion crucially depends on the substitution parameter of the utility function. Thus, in this paper, we add Part 
III, in which the Walrasian process to compute the various taxes is constructed in order to examine whether stability 
is guaranteed. The Part III follows the tradition of comparative statics in economics: i.e. conclusions must be 
compatible with market stability (Samuelson3).  
2.  Economy with public good and Walras-Lindahl mechanism: specified GE model: part I (1) 
We start with constructing a primitive GE model which incorporates a public good. The production and utility 
functions are specified by particular functions, and their parameters are also specified. Utilizing Walras-Lindahl 
mechanism, the optimal level of public good, as well as burden-sharing of each member of the society, is derived.  
2.1. Assumptions on production side 
Country A is under national isolation. She has three sectors of production, which produces 3 goods, utilizing 
labor, Li, and capital, Ki: y stands for the output of sector 1, x stands for the output of sector 2, and z stands for the 
output of sector 3 (i=1, 2, 3), where y and x are private goods and z is a public good. Production function of sector 1, 
y=f1=L1a1K1b1, with a1+b1<1: decreasing returns to scale, is specified by f1=L11/6K11/5. Production function of sector 
2, x=f2=L2a2K2b2, with a2+b2<1: decreasing returns to scale, is specified by f2=L21/4K21/3. Production function of 
sector 3, z=f3=L3a3K3b3, with a3+b3=1: constant returns to scale, is specified by f3=L31/3K32/3. From the profit 
maximization of the sector 1, demand for labor, L1D, and demand for capital, K1D, are computed with py, the price of 
the consumption good, y, wL, the wage rate of labor, and wK, the rental price of capital, as parameters. Thus, the 
supply function of y, yS, is computed with py, wL, and wK, as parameters. The profit function of sector 1, π1, is 
computed, with py, wL, and wK, as parameters. This profit accrues to entrepreneur 1. From the profit maximization of 
the sector 2, demand for labor,  L2D , and demand for capital,  K2D , are computed with  px, the price of the 
consumption good, x, wL and wK as parameters. Thus, the supply function of x, xS, is computed with px, wL, and wK, 
as parameters. The profit function of sector 2, π2, is computed, with px, wL, and wK, as parameters. This profit 
accrues to entrepreneur 2. The sector 3 produces a public good, z, under constant returns to scale, so that demand 
for capital,  K3D, and the one for labor,  L3D, is derived by the minimizing cost, given output level z, with wL and wK, 
as parameters. The price of the public good, pz, is determined so that pzz= wLL3D+wK K3D. 
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2.2.  Assumptions on consumption side 
We proceed to the demand side of country A. She is endowed with the initial labor, Le, and the initial capital, Ke. 
In this paper, the aggregate worker possesses αL of Le and βL of Ke, while the aggregate capitalist possesses αK of Le 
and βK of Ke, where αL+αK=1 and βL+βK=1. It is specified in this section that Le=100, Ke=50, αL=1, αK=0, βL=0, and 
βK=1. All the agents in this paper: (aggregate) workers, (aggregate) capitalists, and 2 entrepreneurs, have the same 
CES utility function, u[y, x, z] = (γyyk+γxxk+γzzk)1/k  which is specified as u[y, x, z] = (y1/2+x1/2+z1/2)2 : i.e. k=1/2, 
γy=γx=γz=1.   All the consumers maximize utility subject to income constraint: 
 
max u[y, x, z]  s.t. pyy+pxx+θjpzz=mj (j=L, K, 1, 2)                                                                                                  (1) 
 
where mj  is income and θj is the burden share of the household j for the public good (j=L, K, 1, 2, 3). The aggregate 
workers (household L)’s income, mL, consists of initial endowment of labor, evaluated by the wage rate: wLLe. It is 
assumed that they supply Le for labor supply. The aggregate capitalists (household K)’s income, mK, consists of 
initial endowment of capital, evaluated by the rental price of capital: wKKe. It is assumed that they supply Ke for 
capital supply. Entrepreneur 1 (household 1)’s income, m1, consists of the profit for sector 1, π1. Finally, 
entrepreneur 2 (household 2)’s income, m2, consists of the profit for sector 2, π2. 
From (1) the demand function of workers for commodity y, yLD, that for commodity x, xLD, that  for commodity z, 
zLD, the demand function of capitalists for commodity y, yKD, that  for commodity x, xKD, that  for commodity z, zKD, 
the demand function of entrepreneur 1 for commodity y, yE1D, that  for commodity x, xE1D, that for commodity z, 
zE1D, and finally the demand function of entrepreneur 2 for commodity y, yE2D, that for commodity x,  xE2D, that  for 
commodity z,  zE2D are derived. 
2.3. General equilibrium with public good: Walras-Lindahl equilibrium with Lindahl tax 
General equilibrium for country A with public good, “GE with public good”, or Walras-Lindahl equilibrium, is 
defined by the following system of simultaneous equations. 
 
yLD + yKD + yE1D + yE2D = yS                                                                                                                                      (2) 
xLD + xKD + xE1D + xE2D = xS                                                                                                                                      (3) 
zLD = zKD = zE1D = zE2D =z                                                                                                                                         (4) 
L1D + L2D + L3D = Le                                                                                                                                                 (5) 
K1D + K2D + K3D = Ke                                                                                                                                               (6)          
     
From the application of Newton method on (2), (3), (4) and (6) we compute the GE with public good, which 
satisfies (5). This “GE with public good” with the optimum level zO= 56.385556, is also derived by the following 
Walras-Lindahl differential equations, in which t stands for time. 
 
 dpy[t]/dt= yLD + yKD + yE1D +yE2D– yS 
dpx[t]/dt=  xLD + xKD + xE1D + xE2D – xS 
dwK[t]/dt= K1D +  K2D + K3D –Ke   
dθL[t]/dt= zLD – (zLD + zKD + zE1D + zE2D)/4                                                                                                              (7) 
dθK[t]/dt= zKD – (zLD + zKD + zE1D + zE2D)/4  
dθ1[t]/dt= zE1D – (zLD + zKD + zE1D + zE2D)/4 
dz[t]/dt= zE2D – z[t] 
 
The set of GE incomes after the deduction of Lindahl tax (payment for the consumption of public good), {mL*, 
mK*, mE1*, mE2*}, and the one of GE utility levels, {uL*, uK*, uE1*, uE2*} are computed easily. 
The Gini coefficients before and after the Lindahl tax, GiniL0 and GiniL, are given respectively as in what follows. 
 
GiniL0=0.473504, GiniL =0.605159                                                                                                                        (8) 
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2.4. General equilibrium with public good: income tax provision of public good 
In this subsection, we examine if it is possible to use income tax instead to Lindahl tax in order to achieve the 
optimum public good level, zO= 56.385556. Since zO is provided for each member of the society, the utility function 
becomes the following one u[y, x, zO]. 
All the consumers maximize utility subject to income constraint: 
 
max u[y, x, zO]  s.t. pyy+pxx=(1–τI)mj     (j=L, K, 1, 2)                                                                                             (9) 
 
One of the GE conditions, (4), is replaced by the following. 
 
pzz=τI (wL Le+ wK Ke+ π1+ π2 )                                                                                                                                (10) 
 
Utilizing the Newton method, we obtain the GE prices and tax rate τI= 0.807053. 
It is ascertained that we have exactly the same GE prices as in the Lindahl tax case. The set of GE incomes after 
the deduction of income tax, {mL*I, mK*I, mE1*I, mE2*I}, and the one of GE utility levels, {uL*I, uK*I, uE1*I, uE2*I} are 
computed easily 
From the viewpoint of Bentham-type utilitarian, the income tax is more desirable than the Lindahl tax, since the 
sum of utility for the former case is greater than the one for the latter case, as shown in what follows. 
 
uL*I+uK*I+uE1*I+uE2*I= 306.468869> 296.859740= uL*+uK*+uE1*+uE2* 
 
Furthermore, the income tax is more desirable than the Lindahl tax in the sense that the Gini coefficient for the 
former, GiniI is smaller than the latter case, as shown in what follows. 
 
GiniI =0.473504                                                                                                                                                      (11) 
  
It is also ascertained that the Gini coefficient for income tax is exactly the same as the pre-tax Gini coefficient for 
Lindahl tax case. 
2.5. General equilibrium with public good: proportional commodity tax provision of public good 
In this subsection, we examine if it is possible to use the proportional commodity tax instead to Lindahl tax in 
order to achieve the optimum public good level, zO.  
All the consumers maximize utility subject to income constraint: 
 
 max u[y, x, zO]  s.t. (1–τC)pyy+(1–τC)pxx=mj     (j=L, K, 1, 2)                                                                               (12) 
 
One of the GE conditions, (4), is replaced by the following. 
 
 pzz=τC py (yLD+yKD+yE1D+yE2D) + τC px (xLD+xKD+xE1D+xE2D)                                                                                (13) 
 
It is confirmed that exactly the same GE prices utilities and incomes are derived as in the income tax case except 
for the proportional commodity tax rate, τC= 4.18278. Thus, the proportional commodity tax is more desirable than 
the Lindahl tax. Note that the equality of the income taxation and the proportional commodity taxation on GE was 
noticed in Shoven and Whalley4. 
2.6. General equilibrium with public good: poll tax provision of public good 
In this subsection, we examine if it is possible to use poll tax instead to Lindahl tax in order to achieve the 
optimum public good level, zO. 
All the consumers maximize utility subject to income constraint: 
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max u[y, x, zO]  s.t. pyy+pxx=(mj–T/4)    (j=L, K, 1, 2)                                                                                           (14) 
 
where mj is pre-tax income and T  is the tax to sustain zO (j=L, K, 1, 2) . One of the GE conditions, (4), is replaced 
by the following. 
 
 pzz=T                                                                                                                                                                     (15) 
 
It is confirmed that exactly the same GE prices and utilities are derived as in the income tax case except for the 
poll tax, T= 259.964421. It must be noted, however, that the poll tax cannot sustain zO, since the income after the 
poll tax is negative for entrepreneurs 1 and 2. 
 
π1–T/4=–48.327516, π2–T/4=–50.057708 
 
(The computation in Section 2 was conducted in Fukiharu5). 
3.   Robustness of the specified GE model: part I (2) 
In this section, we examine the robustness of the conclusion in Section 2. First, modification of parameters is 
made, in order to examine the conclusion. Suppose that a1=2/3, b1 =1/8, a2=1/2, b2 =1/3, a2=3/5, b3 =2/5, Le=100, 
Ke=50, αL=2/3, αK=1/5, βL=1/3, and βK=4/5, k=1/2, γy=γx=1, and γz=1/100.  
3.1. General equilibrium with public good: Walras-Lindahl equilibrium with Lindahl tax 
The Gini coefficients before and after the Lindahl tax and the Bentham-type utilitarian social utility level are 
given respectively as in what follows. 
 
GiniL0=0.3309739379674684046, GiniL = 0.3310327896068688795  
uL*+uK*+uE1*+uE2*=84.53727799264331946 
3.2. General equilibrium with public good: income tax provision of public good 
The Gini coefficients and the Bentham-type utilitarian social utility level are given respectively as in what 
follows. 
 
GiniI = 0.3309739379674684046= GiniL0<GiniL 
uL*I+uK*I+uE1*I+uE2*I = 84.53727972251664468> uL*+uK*+uE1*+uE2* 
 
Thus, we have the same conclusion as in Section 2: the income tax is more desirable than the Lindahl tax. 
3.3. General equilibrium with public good: proportional commodity tax provision of public good 
We have exactly the same conclusion as in section 2: the proportional commodity tax produces exactly the same 
GE prices and quantities. 
3.4. General equilibrium with public good: poll tax provision of public good 
In comparison with section 2, the optimum public good level, zO=0.038835 is so small, and the poll tax, T= 
0.069481 is also so small, that zO can be supported by T. Every member has positive income after paying the poll 
tax. The Gini coefficient, GiniP, and the Bentham-type utilitarian social utility level, uL*P+uK*P+uE1*P+uE2*P, are 
given respectively as in what follows. 
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GiniP = 0.3311077313088771057>GiniL> GiniI 
uL*P+uK*P+uE1*P+uE2*P =84.53727576387538624< uL*+uK*+uE1*+uE2*< uL*I+uK*I+uE1*I+uE2*I 
 
Thus, the income tax is the best taxation and the poll tax is the worst taxation. (The computation in Section 3 was 
conducted in Fukiharu5.) 
4.  Simulations: part II 
The analysis in Section 2 and 3 might suggest that the income tax and the proportional commodity tax are the 
most desirable taxation. It must be noted, however, that k=1/2 is assumed. If k is selected differently it is not clear 
that the above conclusion is robust. Therefore simulations are necessary with k selected differently from 1/2. 
4.1. Simulation when 0<k<1 
In this subsection, we conduct a simulation to compare the desirability of taxes to provide the public good by 
selecting parameters randomly when 0<k<1. 
In what follows, first, 100 tuples of parameters for {a1,  b1,  a2,  b2,  a3,  b3,  Le,  Ke, αL, αK, βL, βK, k, γy, γx, γz} are 
selected randomly, where  ai+bi<1, i =1, 2, a3+b3=1, αL+αK =1, βL+βK =1, and 0<k <1 are satisfied and ai, bi and αL 
etc. and k are expressed by n/m for  integers n  and m which belongs to  [1, 10],  Le  and  Ke are integers belonging to 
[1, 1000], and γy, γx, γz are integers belonging to [1, 10]. Next, we apply them to the Mathematica program to 
compute GE prices, tax rates, utilities, and incomes. Among 100 simulations only 65 simulations satisfy required 22 
equilibrium conditions. The reason for the smallness of the number stems from the Newton method itself, stability 
of the process on which crucially depends on the initial position. In order to raise the number, we must search for the 
initial position which guarantees the stability of the process for each simulation. Unfortunately, however, in this 
paper fixed initial position is utilized. Among 65 “successful” simulations, 59 cases satisfied GiniL> GiniI and 
uL*+uK*+uE1*+uE2*< uL*I+uK*I+uE1*I+uE2*I. In other words, 90% of the “successful” simulations guaranteed the 
conclusion in Section 2. Among the “unsuccessful” simulations, there existed some complex-number-income 
solutions for the poll tax, so that the comparison between the poll taxation and other taxations was not done. 
We repeated this simulations 50 times. The following data shows the shares of the cases which satisfied GiniL> 
GiniI and uL*+uK*+uE1*+uE2*< uL*I+uK*I+uE1*I+uE2*I among the “successful” simulations. 
 
{0.913793, 0.934426, 0.939394, 0.896552, 0.936508, 0.955882, 0.921875, 0.875, 0.924528, 0.923077, 0.983871, 
0.898551, 0.903226, 0.964286, 1, 0.95082, 0.870968, 0.940299, 0.919355, 0.931034, 0.963636, 0.919355, 
0.916667, 0.962963, 0.916667, 0.890909, 0.980769, 0.935484, 0.984848, 0.958904, 0.916667, 0.9, 0.876923, 
0.983333, 0.965517, 0.916667, 0.955224, 0.9375, 0.9375, 0.861538, 0.984375, 0.82, 0.936508, 0.885714, 
0.915254, 0.901639, 0.857143, 0.936508, 0.935484, 0.919355} 
  
Thus we may conclude that more than 90% of the “successful” simulations guaranteed the conclusion in Section 
2. 
4.2. Simulation  when -10<k<0 
In this subsection, we conduct a simulation to compare the desirability of taxes to provide the public goods by 
selecting parameters randomly when k<0. It was ascertained first that when k=-2 (a1=1/8, b1 =4/5, a2=5/6, b2 =1/7, 
a2=2/7, b3 =5/7, Le=348, Ke=878, αL=1/2, αK=1/2, βL=4/9, and βK=5/9, k=-2, γy=13, γx=9, and γz=4), we have 
GiniL<GiniI and uL*+uK*+uE1*+uE2*>uL*I+uK*I+uE1*I+uE2*I, with 22 equilibrium conditions satisfied. Thus, in this 
specified case, Lindahl tax is more desirable than income tax and commodity tax.  This conclusion is completely 
opposite to the one in 4.1. In this specified case, the poll tax is feasible, but the comparison between the poll tax and 
other taxes was impossible. Note that k<0 does not violate the decreasing marginal rate of substitution. 
In what follows, first, 100 tuples of parameters for {a1,  b1,  a2,  b2,  a3,  b3,  Le,  Ke, αL, αK, βL, βK, k, γy, γx, γz} are 
selected randomly, where  ai+bi<1, i =1, 2, a3+b3=1, αL+αK =1, βL+βK =1, and integer k with -10<k <0 are satisfied 
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and ai, bi and αL etc. are expressed by n/m for  integers n  and m which belongs to  [1, 10],  Le  and  Ke are integers 
belonging to [1, 1000], and γy, γx, γz are integers belonging to [1, 10]. Among 100 simulations only 33 cases satisfied 
22 equilibrium conditions. The reason for the smallness of the number stems from the Newton method itself, as 
explained in the previous subsection. We repeated this 100-simulation session 50 times. The following data shows 
the number of simulations in each session which satisfy 22 equilibrium conditions. 
 
{28, 37, 34, 35, 32, 29, 26, 26, 27, 34, 28, 34, 30, 26, 28, 25, 32, 33, 27, 31, 25, 29, 27, 36, 28, 32, 23, 32, 25, 37, 
33, 33, 28, 21, 29, 25, 23, 30, 31, 33, 34, 25, 32, 33, 34, 31, 30, 32, 28, 32} 
 
Even though the probability of “successful” Newton method convergence is approximately 30%, among the 
“successful” simulations the probability of the occurrence of GiniL < GiniI and uL*+uK*+uE1*+uE2* > uL*I+ uK*I+ 
uE1*I+uE2*I is quite high. 
For the above-mentioned repeated 50 sessions, the following data shows the shares of the cases whose conclusion 
is completely opposite to the one in 4.1 among the “successful” simulations with 22 equilibrium conditions satisfied. 
 
{0.928571, 0.972973, 0.970588, 1, 0.9375, 0.931034, 1, 1, 1, 0.970588, 1, 1, 1, 0.961538, 0.964286, 0.96, 1, 
0.969697, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0.962963, 0.944444, 0.964286, 0.96875, 0.913043, 0.9375, 1, 0.945946, 1, 1, 0.964286, 1, 1, 
0.92, 1, 0.966667, 0.967742, 1, 0.970588, 1, 1, 1, 0.970588, 1, 0.966667, 0.96875, 0.928571, 0.96875} 
 
Thus, more than 95% is the probability of the occurrence of GiniL < GiniI and uL*+uK*+uE1*+uE2* > uL*I+ uK*I+ 
uE1*I+uE2*I. (The computation in Section 4 was conducted in Fukiharu6.) 
5.  Walrasian tatonnement: part III 
Specifying parameters on production and utility functions and initial endowments randomly, Fukiharu1 showed 
that when 0<k<1, the income tax (and proportional commodity tax) is more desirable than the Lindahl tax from the 
fairness and efficiency viewpoints with high possibility of non-existence for poll tax general equilibrium. However, 
when k<0, specifying parameters on production and utility functions and initial endowments randomly, Fukiharu1 
showed that the Lindahl tax is more desirable than the income tax (and proportional commodity tax) from the 
fairness and efficiency viewpoints with high possibility of existence for poll tax although the comparison between 
the poll tax and other taxes are impossible from the two viewpoints. Thus, in Fukiharu1 the comparison completely 
depends on the substitution parameter of the CES utility function.  In this chapter, stability analysis is first 
conducted on the Walras-Lindahl Mechanism. Samuelson3 established a tradition in economics of deriving 
conclusions from the stability conditions on the markets. In other words, the economic conclusions must be 
compatible with stability of the markets. 
5.1. Stability of Walras-Lindahl mechanism 
   As shown in Section 2, the solution to the system of general equilibrium: (2) ~ (6), can be derived by applying the 
Newton method, while it is also derived by the Walras-Lindahl mechanism, (7). It is ascertained that when 0<k<1, 
(7) is globally stable, in the sense that starting from whatever the initial position of parameters, the dynamic process 
converges to the GE prices with optimal public good. This is not the case when k<1. In 4.2, when k=-2 (a1=1/8, b1 
=4/5, a2=5/6, b2 =1/7, a2=2/7, b3 =5/7, Le=348, Ke=878, αL=1/2, αK=1/2, βL=4/9, and βK=5/9, k=-2, γy=13, γx=9, and 
γz=4), we had GiniL<GiniI and uL*+uK*+uE1*+uE2*>uL*I+uK*I+uE1*I+uE2*I. For this specification (7) is not globally 
stable, whereas it is locally stable. Indeed, on (7), starting from θ1[0]=5/10, θL[0]=1/10, and θK[0]=3/10, the 
trajectory of Θ[t]=θ1[t]+θL[t]+θK[t] reaches 1 when t=0.0010, and the dynamic process stops there. The actual 
trajectory of Θ[t] in this simulation is provided in Figure 1. 
Naturally, if we select the initial values sufficiently close to the GE prices with public good, the dynamic process 
is stable. Thus, when k<0, the Walras-Lindahl mechanism is locally stable. This stability analysis may well reflect 
the high convergence result on the Newton method for 0<k<1 and the low convergence result for k<0. 
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Fig.1: The trajectory of Θ[t]=θ1[t]+θL[t]+θK[t] 
 
5.2. Walrasian tatonnement process to compute the rate of income tax 
    In spite of the well-known usefulness in the theoretical application, the Newton method has a fatal flaw in the 
actual policy application. When the utility functions and production functions are known to the policy makers, they 
can easily compute the solution to (2) ~ (6) by simply applying the Newton method. In the actual world, however, it 
is quite difficult to estimate those functions, and the Walras-type tatonnement process is far more useful, in the sense 
that the policy makers’ role is to announce the candidate for the solution to the economic agents such as consumers, 
and they just have to change it according to (7) when it is not the solution.  
    In the case of computing the rate of income tax in Subsection 3.2, the corresponding Walrasian tatonnement 
process may be the following system of differential equations. 
 
dpy[t]/dt= yLD + yKD + yE1D +yE2D– yS         
dpx[t]/dt=  xLD + xKD + xE1D + xE2D – xS                                                                                                                  (16) 
dwK[t]/dt= K1D +  K2D + K3D –Ke    
dτI[t]/dt= pzz–τI (wL Le+ wK Ke+ π1+ π2)         
 
In (16), note that since the constant returns to scale assumption on the public good sector requires profit to be zero 
at the general equilibrium pz z= wLL3D+wK K3D must hold at GE and wL=1. 
It is possible to show in simulation that when 0<k<1, (16) is globally stable. (16) is locally unstable, however, 
when k<1. In the same parametric specification as in 4.2 and 5.1, the set of Eigen-values on the Jacobian matrix for 
(16) is {-24237.6, 3316.82, -652.992, -202.928}. As is well-known all the elements in the set must be negative in 
order for (16) to be locally stable. 
  As a conclusion, we may assert that, independent of k, the income tax (and proportional commodity tax) is more 
desirable than the Lindahl tax from the fairness and efficiency viewpoints with high possibility of non-existence for 
poll tax general equilibrium. (The computation in Section 5 was conducted in Fukiharu7.) 
6.  Conclusions 
It is a tradition in economics to take account of stability condition in examining the comparative statics. The aim 
of this paper is to resort to this tradition in examining the problem of whether the income taxation is superior to the 
Lindahl taxation or not. In Fukiharu1, the present author derived the opposing conclusions on this problem 
depending on the parametric specification. In other words, when the substitution parameter on the CES utility 
function is positive the income taxation tends to be superior to the Lindahl taxation, while the opposite conclusion 
holds when the substitution parameter is negative. Fukiharu1 computed the general equilibrium prices and tax rates 
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in terms of either the Newton method or the Walras-Lindahl mechanism. In the present paper, on the one hand, those 
prices and taxes are computed solely in terms of Walras-Lindahl mechanism, and derived an interesting result, in 
which the Walras-Lindahl mechanism tends to be globally stable when it computes the Lindahl tax rates for 
providing the optimum public good as well as in computing the income tax rate in sustaining the optimum level of 
public good, so long as the substitution parameter is 1/2. The global stability is quite useful property in computing 
GE prices and tax rates, since whatever the initial positions concerning prices and tax rates may be, the trajectories 
on the differential equations converge to the GE prices and tax rates. On the other hand, when the substitution 
parameter is -2, the Walras-Lindahl mechanism tends to be locally stable when it computes the Lindahl tax rates for 
providing the optimum public good and it is unstable in computing the income tax rate in sustaining the optimum 
level of public good. The local stability is far less useful in computing the GE prices and tax rates, since it is 
required to find a suitable neighborhood of those GE prices and taxes, from which the convergent initial positions 
are selected. This problem is similar to the Newton method. In applying the Newton method it is a difficult task to 
find the initial points which guarantee the convergence to the equilibrium. Indeed, Fukiharu1 adopted the two-stage 
search: i.e. he first computed the Lindahl taxes and prices in terms of Walras-Lindahl mechanism, proceeding to the 
Newton method in computing the income tax rate by selecting those GE prices as the initial points in the Newton 
method.  
The result in this paper may support the income taxation in providing the optimum level of public good. Some 
may well oppose to this argument, since if we utilize the Newton method we could compute the GE prices and taxes. 
However, this opposition could be applied to the tradition of economics. Even if the dynamic system is unstable we 
might compute the new equilibrium so long as we know, say, demand and supply functions. The problem of the 
Newton method, however, lies in this point. In the Newton method, the planner must know the functional form of 
equations. Meanwhile, in Walras-Lindahl mechanism, the planner does not have to know the functional form of 
equations. What he must do is to announce the prices and tentative tax rates and modify them when the demand is 
not equal to supply for at least one item. The required information is very small compared with the Newton method 
in computing equilibrium. 
Thus, we may conclude that the income taxation tends to be superior to the Lindahl taxation independent of the 
parametric specification.  The GE model in the present paper is constructed under the framework of one public good 
and two private goods. The extension to the GE model with more than two private commodities will be attempted in 
the succeeding research. 
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